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INTRODUCTION

Cable television originated shortly after the birth of broadcast television.1 Since that time, it has grown in popularity to the point that, today, it
is found in over thirty-five percent of American television households and

1. See 0. DUNLAP, UNDERSTANDING TELEVISION 25 (1948) (television introduced to
public as regular service in 1939 in New York City); M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE
§ 1.02 at 1-6 (rev. ed. 1982) (cable television system first made available to public in 1948 in
Mahonoy City, Pennsylvania). The FCC defines a cable television system as "[a] nonbroadcast facility . . . that distributes . . . to subscribers the signals of one or more television
broadcast stations ..
" Cable Television Service, 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1982). A coaxial
cable transmits the signals for cable television in contrast to the over-the-air transmission of
traditional broadcast television. See W. BAER, CABLE TELEVISION: A HANDBOOK FOR
DECISIONMAKING 3 (1974). Antennas placed in favorable reception locations pick up signals from television stations which are then brought into the cable distribution system and
eventually fed into subscribers' homes. See id at 4. Coaxial cables are strung on overhead
utility poles or buried in underground ducts. See id at 3-4.
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is predicted to be in fifty to sixty percent by 1990.2 Cable transmission
began as a service to communities which had inadequate or no reception
of conventional over-the-air television broadcasting.' Cable system entrepreneurs, however, soon realized that another potentially lucrative market
existed in communities without broadcast reception difficulties but in
which the citizens wanted expanded viewing alternatives which could be
provided by additional cable television channels. In 1966, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) first exerted its regulatory authority
over the cable industry,5 and in 1972 this commission issued a comprehensive set of rules which greatly expanded the new medium's potential.6 Today, the cable industry is also subject to the control of state and local
bodies which must govern within the boundaries set by the United States
Constitution.7
Cable has evolved from mere retransmission of television broadcasts
into a system of channels which show exclusively such subjects as news,
movies, weather, sports, children's programming, educational programming, and Spanish language shows.8 It has joined broadcast television,
radio, books, movies, and newspapers as an "important source of information and entertainment for Americans." 9 Each of these media of commu-

2. See Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32
603 (1983) (citing Nielsen Charts Cable Universe at 35% Penetration,
10, 1983, at 92 (Nielsen November 1982 market-by-market figures));
Cable.- Coming to Terms with Adulthood & A Ffth Estate Glossary, BROADCASTING, Jan. 3,
1983, at 74-75).
3. See W. BAER, CABLE TELEVISION: A HANDBOOK FOR DECISIONMAKING 4 (1974).
4. See id at 4. The person who received public distinction as the father of cable television was John Walson, Sr., of Mahonoy City, Pennsylvania. In 1948, he began a subscription service which today services over 200,000 viewers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. See
M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 1.02 at 1-6 (rev. ed. 1982).
5. See First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). Locally, cable systems generally
operate under a franchise from the governmental body because they use municipal and
county rights-of-way. See Irving, Tex., Ordinance 3626 (April 3, 1981) (granting franchise
to Teleprompter of Irving, Inc.); see also San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 49433 (Sept. 7, 1978)
(granting franchise to UA-Columbia Cablevision of Texas, Inc.).
6. See Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .. ");
see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of
speech.
...
). The free speech provision of the first amendment has been held applicable
to the states by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
8. See Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32
CATH. U.L. REV. 603, 603 (1983).
9. Krattenmaker & Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs.- The New Morality
Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 606, 606 (1983).
CATH. U.L. REV. 603,
BROADCASTING, Jan.
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nication produces its own first amendment issues,1 0 and cable television is
no exception."' The appropriate boundaries of content regulation of cable
television have been addressed by the FCC, Congress, state legislatures,
and city governments, and a particular concern recently has been "indecent" programming. 2 Cable television has been described in the Ameri' 13
can Bar Association Journal as "the new obscenity battleground;"
however, the issue is not really obscenity but a type of programming which
does not rise to the level of constitutionally proscribed hard-core pornography. Against a backdrop of the United States Supreme Court's leading
first amendment decision concerning obscenity, Miller v. Calfornia,"4and
the later FCC v. Pacofca Foundation15 case, in which the Court authorized
regulation of indecent language, this comment will explore content control
of cable television. The issue in focus is whether indecent programming
on cable television may be constitutionally proscribed. The indication
from the courts thus far is that it may not. An examination of the reasoning behind this result will conclude this analysis.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR INDECENT MATERIAL ON
CABLE TELEVISION

The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech .. ."16 Freedom of speech has long been considered a fundamen-

tal right in Western democratic society.

7

Justice Cardozo described it as

10. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (newspaper publishers protected by first amendment from being required to print rebuttals from
victims of criticism); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (allowing
person attacked in broadcast time to respond enhances freedom of speech); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures, despite being medium of entertainment as well as information, and large scale business, entitled to first amendment protection); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (discussing uniqueness of
first amendment problems of various media of expression).
11. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 126 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (Miami ordinance prohibiting "indecency" on cable television unconstitutional violation of first amendment rights);
Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1172-73 (N.D. Utah
1982) (city ordinance proscribing indecent material on cable television unconstitutional violation of right to free speech); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 999
(N.D. Utah 1982) (proposed Utah statute banning indecency from cable television
unconstitutional).
12. See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 6.05 (rev. ed. 1982).
13. See Winter, Channel X, 69 A.B.A. J. 886, 886 (1983).
14. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
15. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See Dunagin v. Oxford, 489 F. Supp. 763, 769 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (quoting J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 858 (2d ed. 1983). "The freedom of
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"the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. . . . [A] pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and legal."'" Freedom of speech along with freedom of the
press allows for discussion of the problems of society including the right to
criticize government and public officials. 9 The bases of these rights is the
assumption that unencumbered interchange of ideas will foster a healthy
political and social environment.2" This right to speak freely and even to
encourage exchange of diverse opinions is characteristic of the American
way of life. 2'
A.

FirstAmendment Rights and Guarantees

While there is some authority for the position that first amendment
22
rights are more important than other constitutional rights or guarantees,
the more generally accepted view is that there is no such priority and all
are on an equal footing.23 Therefore, in a situation where rights are in
opposition, the necessary balancing of interests presents a difficult, delicate
task 4 The result is that the fundamental constitutional rights and privispeech . . . has been recognized as one of the preeminent rights of Western democratic
theory, the touchstone of individual liberty." Id at 769.
18. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
19. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (suppression of right of press to
criticize government violates first amendment); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85
(1966) (criticism of government at core of constitutinal right of free discussion).
20. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The constitutional
safeguard [of first amendment rights] . . . was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.") (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
21. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) ("For it is a prized American
privilege to speak one's mind although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions.").
22. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (freedoms of first amendment belong in preferred position when balancing community interests in deciding constitutionality
of local regulation); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (rights of freedom of press
and speech occupy preferred position to rights of property owners); see also Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (free speech as contrasted to other
civil rights has preferred position because first amendment prohibits abridgment in absolute
terms).
23. See Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (authors of Bill of
Rights did not assign priorities); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944)
(doubtful that any freedoms guaranteed by first amendment are more important than any
others since all have preferred position).
24. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975) (cases pitting
first amendment rights of speakers against unwilling viewers demand delicate balancing). In
this case, a city ordinance which prohibited a drive-in theatre from showing films with
nudity where the screen could be seen from the street and could ostensibly invade privacy
interests was declared invalid on its face and unconstitutional. See id at 217-18.
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leges of individuals are not absolute and each may only be exercised to the
extent that it is consistent with the enjoyment of fundamental rights by
all.25 Thus, even the protection of the right to speak provided by the first
amendment is subject to some limitation when it conflicts with a more important civil right.26 The types of speech which can be regulated include
defamation,2 7 fighting words,2" obscenity,2 9 and that which incites imminent lawless action,30 because of their respective intrusions upon other
more highly valued rights and their failure to provide anything substantial
to our highly valued interchange of ideas. 3'
When a statute or ordinance is attacked as an unconstitutional invasion
of a fundamental right or guarantee, the balance becomes one of personal
right versus specific societal interests, and a careful analysis of the challenged legislation becomes imperative.3 2 To impinge upon a fundamental
right, a state must have a compelling interest, and legislation must be
drawn narrowly so as to address only the legitimate state interest
involved.33
25. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (many provisions of Bill of
Rights subject to exceptions).
26. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (freedom of speech and
association not absolutes); Augustus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1975) (exception to first amendment rights of students when their exercise causes violence and disrupts
educational process); Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (no first
amendment protection for behavior made unlawful by legitimate legislation or regulation
enacted for purpose unrelated to free expression).
27. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public official may
recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct only if proves statement made with "actual malice").
28. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (New Jersey statute
providing punishment for one who speaks words likely to cause breach of peace in public
place does not unconstitutionally infringe on freedom of speech).
29. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (obscenity not protected by first
amendment because it lacks any redeeming social importance).
30. Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (Ohio's criminal syndicalism
statute unconstitutionally broad for failure to distinguish mere advocacy from incitement to
imminent lawless action).
31. See id. at 448; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1949); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.").
32. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (discussing necessity of astute examination of legislation which will restrict freedom of speech).
33. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438 (1963). "Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity." Id at 433. "[Oinly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 438.
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When freedom of speech is the fundamental right involved, the
Supreme Court has traditionally looked very closely at legislation purportedly justified by exercise of the police power; the law enacted to combat a
supposed evil must be very narrowly drawn to pass constitutional muster.34 A law may be attacked for vagueness or overbreadth, upon its face
or as applied. Vagueness presents a particular problem because individuals fearing violation of an unclear, imprecise law might forego first amendment rights rather than take a chance on prosecution.3 5 Overly broad
statutes are a problem because of the possibility that protected speech may
be silenced along with the unprotected speech. 36 Generally, in cases involving spoken words, the Court has determined that the possibility of
harm to society from letting some unprotected speech go unpunished is
outweighed by the danger of protected speech being silenced and has
voided such statutes.37

34. See Grausam v. Murphey, 448 F.2d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 405
U.S. 981 (1972).
35. See Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 353 (1959). Scull was subpoenaed to appear
before a committee established by the Virginia legislature to promote their resistance to
desegregation in the public schools after he and others published a pro-integration newsletter. See id at 347. He refused to answer certain questions because neither the subpoena nor
the committee adequately clarified the purpose of the inquiry. See id at 347. His subsequent contempt conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court which held that such
vagueness cannot be supported because fear of violating an unclear law might induce individuals to give up rights of speech, press, and association. See id at 353.
36. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) ("The danger of that
chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by
sensitive tools which clearly inform ...what is being proscribed."). See generally Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 882-910 (1970) (overbreadth doctrine discussed as applied to first amendment privileges).
37. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Legislation may be unconstitutional because of both overbreadth and vagueness. See, e.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3 (1973) (defendant convicted of violating city code prohibiting use of
menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language could raise issue of its vagueness or
unconstitutional overbreadth as applied to others); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611, 616 (1971) (city ordinance prohibiting gatherings of three or more on street corners
from annoying passers-by invalid on face); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
602, 604 (1967) (New York statute concerning removal of educators for advocating forcible
overthrow of government unconstitutionally vague and broadly stifling). The doctrines have
not always been clearly distinguished by the Supreme Court. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (statute "unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope"). But see
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967) (distinguishing doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness). A statute is void for vagueness if it "'either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.'" See id at 249 (quoting Connally v. General Construction
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). A statute is void for overbreadth if it "offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol15/iss2/7

6

Robbins: Indeceny on Cable Television - A Barren Battleground for Regulati

1984]

COMMENTS

B. Balancing Freedom of Speech with the Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is perhaps, more than any other, the right which
most conflicts with the first amendment.3 8 The conflict between these two
fundamental rights has traditionally been resolved in favor of the one
deemed by the Court to be more important in the context of the particular
situation.3 9 Nonetheless, some general principles have emerged.
To justify eliminating a source of information to protect certain people
from exposure to it requires that the government show "substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."4 This
intolerable invasion is most likely to occur in the privacy of one's home.4
For this reason, under some circumstances, the government may appropriately prohibit material from entering the home which could not constitutionally be barred from the public forum. a 2 Nevertheless, in public,
material which is forced upon an unwillingly captive audience that may
not practically avoid exposure to it is also subject to regulation.4 3 In both
situations, the first amendment strictly limits the authority of the local governmental body to select certain speech for prohibition because it is judged
to be offensive to some viewers or auditors.' On the other hand, a state or
municipality may protect the right to privacy by passing legislation containing time, place, and manner restrictions, but such regulations are ap-

and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'" Id at 250 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
38. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time. First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 956-67 (1968) (discusses
conflict between rights of free speech and privacy).
39. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (each case decided
based on own specific facts when rights of privacy and free speech conflict). "In this sphere
of collision between claims of privacy and those of [free speech or] the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
40. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (wearing jacket stating "F
the
Draft" in public place not invasion of substantial privacy interests in essentially intolerable
manner because unwilling viewers could easily have averted eyes).
41. Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) ("ancient
concept that 'a man's home is his castle' . . . has lost none of its vitality").
42. Compare id. at 737 (person permitted to have postmaster stop mailing of catalogue
to home because of objection to contents) with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)
(breach of peace conviction overturned for public display of expletive on jacket).
43. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (sustaining city
policy banning political advertisement while permitting other advertisements on city buses).
But see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) (declaring unconstitutional city ordinance prohibiting drive-in theatre from showing nudity visible from public
street).
44. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
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plicable to all speech irrespective of content.4 5 This conflict between first
amendment rights of speakers and the privacy rights of unwilling viewers
or listeners is not one easily resolved, and the medium of cable television
has plainly introduced a new constitutional dilemma, particularly when
the subject matter at issue is "indecent."
III.

MILLER V CALIFORNIA -

THE SUPREME COURT'S DEFINITION OF
OBSCENITY

In 1957, in Roth v. United States,46 the Supreme Court first held that
obscenity was not protected material under the first amendment.4 7 The
Court announced the following test for determining if material was obscene: "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interests., 48 Unfortunately, the lower courts had difficulty understanding and applying the test, and the resulting confusion led to many
cases reaching the Supreme Court between 1957 and 1973.49 The justices
themselves could not agree on application of the Roth guidelines to specific
cases, and their individual rationales grew more divergent.50 Consequently, the Court began the practice of per curiam voting with each jus-

45. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); see also Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (no constitutional right exists to propagandize protests or
views whenever, however, and wherever person desires to do so); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.

536, 554 (1965) (right of free speech does not mean person may express opinions or beliefs to
any group at anytime at any public place).
46. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

47. See id at 485. The constitutionality of a federal criminal obscenity statute was at
issue (18 U.S.C. § 1461), as well as the constitutionality of a similar provision in the California Penal Code (CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1955)). See id at 479. Both statutes were
upheld. See id.at 492.
48. See id at 489. The early leading test for obscenity considered only the effect of an
isolated excerpt on a particularly susceptible person. See id.at 488-89 (citing Regina v.
Hicklin, [18681 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360).
49. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (reversed convictions
under state laws for selling certain books and magazines); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 466 (1966) (three publications held obscene because they represented "commercial
exploitation of erotica only for the sake of prurient appeal"); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 419-20 (1966)
(conviction under state obscenity statute previously used to find Fanny Hill obscene
overturned).
50. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1015 (2d ed.
1983). The majority could never agree on the appropriate community for "contemporary
community standards" with some justices preferring a national community standard and
others favoring a local community or flexibility for state standard. See id at 1015-16. Nor
could they agree on whether "prurient interest" referred to dissemination to a clearly defined deviant sexual group or the "average" or "normal" person. See id at 1016.
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tice casting a vote based on application of his own test."' If five deemed
the material not to be obscene, then the conviction for dissemination was
reversed.52 While this approach resolved the dispute between the litigating
parties, it provided virtually no guidance for legislators, other courts, and
potential litigants.53 Finally, in 1973, in Miller v. California,54 the Court,
while affirming the Roth opinion that obscenity is unprotected speech, formulated a three-pronged test which remains the standard today.55 The
Court held that material is obscene and, therefore, not protected by the
first amendment if:
the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest,. . . the work depicts or decribes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
.. . the work taken56 as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value.
Miller, therefore, permitted a state or local government to regulate obscenity which, by virtue of the Court's opinion, is a narrowly defined type
of material.57 Portrayal of material which does not satisfy all three of the
Miller criteria might be offensive, but is nonetheless protected by the first
amendment. 58 Despite subsequent Supreme Court cases involving unsuccessful efforts by state and local governments to ban such material,5 9 the
Court has, on one occasion, supported the FCC in its imposition of restrictions on the broadcasting of indecent material via radio. 60 The FCC,
therefore, apparently has been successful, to some extent, in circumventing

51. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82-83 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
52. See id at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

53. See id at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In violation of a California statute making it a misdemeanor to
knowingly distribute obscene matter, defendant had mailed unsolicited advertising
brochures containing pictures and drawings explicitly depicting sexual activities. See id. at
16.
55. See id. at 24.

56. Id at 24.
57. See id at 24. The Court stated that, if the states, in regulating obscene material,
follow these guidelines, then the first amendment values applicable to the states through the

fourteenth amendment are adequately protected. See id at 25. If there is a question of
constitutionality, the appellate courts are available for independent review. See id at 25.
58. See id at 24-25.
59. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975) (invalidating

municipal ordinance prohibiting drive-in theatres from exhibiting films containing nudity
when screen visible from public place); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 155 (1974) (revers-

ing conviction for distributing movie "Carnal Knowledge").
60. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
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the first amendment in the regulation of broadcast media.6 1
IV.

THE HISTORY OF

FCC

REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION

The need for regulation of radio broadcasting became apparent in the
mid-1920's.62 Radio had grown in popularity to such an extent that stations, which began broadcasting in response to the demand, crowded the
radio wavelength, making listening often impossible.6 3 Congress determined that regulation of the industry was needed and passed the Federal
Radio Act of 1927,64 which created the predecessor of the FCC, the Federal Radio Commission, as the responsible regulatory body.6 5 Shortly
thereafter, Congress enacted the successor to the 1927 Act, the Communications Act of 1934,66 which, as amended, remains the relevant legislation
today.67 Through the 1934 Act, the FCC was given broad authority to
regulate communication by wire and radio,6 8 with its powers being distributed into two subject matter subchapters:
"Common Carriers" 6 9 and
70
Radio."
to
"Special Provisions Relating
Although the FCC was created expressly to regulate the young radio
industry, when television emerged in the 1940's, with its reliance on radio
waves to broadcast, the FCC exercised regulatory authority over it also. 7 '
61. Cf id at 750 (FCC permitted to regulate broadcast of radio program because of
indecent content).
62. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943).
63. See id at 212-13. Justice Frankfurter observed that "With everybody on the air,
nobody could be heard." Id. at 212. Certain facts about radio communication made the
plight the industry found itself in understandable, particularly the fact that the radio spectrum simply couldtnot accommodate everybody because of fixed natural limitations. See id
at 213. When limitations were exceeded, the stations began interfering with one another.
See id at 213. President Coolidge appealed to Congress in a message, on December 7, 1926,
to resolve the chaotic situation with legislation directed at the radio industry. See H.R.
Doc. No. 483, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1926), cited in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943).
64. ch. 169, §§ 1-41, 44 Stat. 1162-74 (1927) (repealed 1934).
65. See id
66. ch. 652, §§ 1-609, 48 Stat. 1064-1105 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 15-609 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
67. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The FCC is comprised of seven
members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for seven year terms. See
id § 154(a), (c). Three members must be appointed from each of the major political parties
with the chairperson belonging to the political party of the President. See id. § 154(a), (b).
68. See id § 151.
69. See id §§ 201-223.
70. See id §§ 301-330.
71. See Allen v. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1950)
(section 153(b) of Communications Act of 1934 includes television as one form of radio
transmission); see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976) (defining "radio communication" or "communication by wire").
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Cable television systems, however, presented a new problem because they
were neither common carriers nor radio communicators under the terms of
the statute.7 2 A "common carrier" is defined as "any person engaged as
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy . . . but a
person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so
engaged, be deemed a common carrier."7 3 The statute defines "radio communication" as "the transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities,
apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and
delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission."7 4 "Broadcasting" is the dissemination of radio communications.7 5
Initially, therefore, the FCC refused to regulate the cable industry and
instead viewed cable television merely as a means to retransmit broadcast
signals.7 6 But, cable continued to grow, and, apparently in response to
television broadcasters' fears about competition from cable television,77
the FCC issued regulations in 1965.78 In general, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over the cable industry and imposed by rules certain conditions on
cable systems which limited and regulated the manner in which they competed with broadcast television.79
In 1968, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC regulatory authority over
cable television in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. 80 Specifically,
the Court held that cable systems do fall within the language of the Communications Act in that they constitute communication by wire8 ' over

72. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-223 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-330 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
73. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
74. Id § 153(b).
75. See id § 153(o).

76. See CATV & TV Repeater Servs., 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-31 (1959) (cable does not fall
within language of act); see also Comment, Obscenity, Cable Television and the FirstAmendment." Will FCC Regulation Impair the Marketplace of Ideas, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 965, 970
(1983) (FCC decided cable not in need of special regulation).
77. See Smith, Primeron the Regulatory Development of CA TV (1950-72), 18 How. L.J.
729, 736-37 (1975). Cable television was initially called CATV or community antenna television. See First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 741 (1965).
78. See First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). For a discussion of the FCC's
gradual assertion of authority over the cable industry, see Berman, C4 TV Leased-Access
Channels and the FCC: The Intractible Jurisdiction Question, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 145,
147-54 (1975).
79. See First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 697-700, 716-30 (1965). For a discussion
of the regulations, see Smith, Primer on the Regulatory Development of CA TV (1950-72), 18
How. L.J. 729, 736-41 (1975).
80. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
81. See 47 C.F.R. § 153(a) (1976). "Wire communication" or "communication by
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which the FCC has jurisdiction.8 2 The authority granted the FCC was
restricted, however, to that "reasonably ancillary" to effective regulation of
the subject of main concern - broadcast television.83
In 1972, the FCC issued rules which removed some of the former restrictions and greatly expanded the potential of cable television.8 4 The 1972
Cable Television Report and Order85 set forth a comprehensive scheme of
channel usage which required that channels be allocated for carriage of
television broadcast signals, origination cablecasting, and access programming for public, educational, local governmental, and leased use.8 6 For
the most part, these rules remain in effect today, only modified somewhat
by two subsequent FCC rulings which, essentially, removed the
mandatory origination requirement 87 and changed the four-channel access
requirement to a requirement of one composite access channel.88
After the Supreme Court established the authority of the FCC to regulate cable television, the FCC turned to content regulation. These regulations distinguish between programming which originates with the local
system, subject to its exclusive control ("origination cablecasting") 8 9 and
programming which originates elsewhere ("cablecasting").9 ° Despite the
standards set forth in Miller, one such regulation bars the transmission of
indecent as well as obscene material on origination cablecasting
channels. 9 '
wire" means "the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by
aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the points of origin and reception of
such transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among
other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such
transmission." Id.,,
82. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). The Court,
quoting from section 152(a) of the Communications Act, stated that the Commission's authority over "all interstate ... communication by wire or radio" permitted regulation of
cable television systems. See id at 178.
83. See id at 178. The Court's extension of the FCC's authority included no guidelines
as to specific areas of regulation such as content. See id.at 178. In fact, the Court expressly
refrained from stating any view as to regulation in any particular circumstances or for any
particular purpose. See id at 178.
84. See Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
85. Id.
86. See id at 189-98.
87. See Report & Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
88. See Report & Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 314-16 (1976).
89. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(w) (1982) ("[pjrogramming (exclusive of broadcast signals)
carried on a cable television system over one or more channels and subject to the exclusive
control of the cable operator").
90. See id.§ 76.5(v) ("[p]rogramming (exclusive of broadcast signals) carried on a cable
television system").
91. See id § 76.215 (1982) (prohibiting cable system operators from transmitting obscene or indecent material on origination cablecasting channels); see also id § 76.205 (re-
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V.

FCC v.PACIFICA

FOUNDATION -

SUPREME COURT RESTRICTION

ON "INDECENT" SPEECH

In 1978, the Supreme Court imposed a content ban on an "indecent"
radio broadcast which clearly did not satisfy the Miller criteria for obscenity. 92 The Court supported the FCC in their contention that their regulatory authority included being able to regulate the nonobscene content of
the broadcast in question, if they did so by resorting to a nuisance rationale. 93 The controversy began in October, 1973, when at approximately
2:00 p.m., a radio station in New York City broadcasted a George Carlin
monologue entitled "Filthy Words."94 The monologue was a satirical look
at the words one could not say on the public airways; Carlin not only said
the words, but repeated them over and over again. 95 A listener, who had
been in his car with his young son when he heard the broadcast, filed a
complaint with the FCC.96 In response, the FCC issued a declaratory order 97 banning the broadcast of the words in question, finding them to be
indecent, pursuant to a federal criminal statute9 8 which prohibited broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language over radio. 99 The FCC defined as indecent: "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of day when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." I Rather than

quiring origination channel to provide equal opportunities to legally qualified candidates in
use of station's facilities); id § 76.209 (requiring origination channel to afford reasonable
opportunity for discussion of conflicting views on controversial issues of public importance);
id § 76.209 (requiring origination channel to notify person or group personally attacked and
offer reasonable time to respond); id § 76.213 (prohibiting origination channel from carrying lottery information, except state run lotteries); id § 76.221 (prohibiting origination channels from carrying advertising which lacks sponsorship identification).
92. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
93. See id at 750.
94. See id.at 729-30.
95. See id at 729. A verbatim transcript of "Filthy Words" is included in the opinion.
See id at 751-55.
96. See id at 730. This was presumably the only complaint lodged with either the FCC
or the radio station. See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 6.05[2] at 6-27 (rev. ed. 1982).

97. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975). "A declaratory
order is a flexible procedural device admirably suited to terminate the present controversy
between a listener and the station and to clarify the standards which the commissioner
utilizes to judge indecent language." Id at 99.
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). This statute, once contained in the Communications
Act, provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years or both." Id
99. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975).
100. Id. at 98.
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imposing administrative sanctions on the broadcaster, the FCC placed a
letter of violation in the station's file to be considered for possible sanctions
in the event other complaints were received against the station.' 0 1
The FCC expressed concern over the exposure of the children to this
offensive material but, at the same time, recognized that the material was
not obscene and had first amendment protection.' 0 The FCC, therefore,
drew upon the law of nuisance to support its decision and spoke of channeling, rather than prohibiting, the offensive behavior.l0 3 By so doing, the
FCC associated the label of "indecent" with the time of day of the broadcast and stated that a similar program, played in the late evening and preceded by a warning, might be permissible.'I
The Carlin monologue was
indecent because it was broadcast at a time when children were likely to be
in the audience. 0 5
The FCC order was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in a two-to-one vote.' °6 Judge Tamm
held that the order was overbroad and vague and, specifically, was a form
of censorship prohibited by section 326 of the Communications Act.'0 7
Judge Bazelon, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the FCC did not
have the power to regulate speech which was not obscene under Miller.'08
The dissent by Judge Leventhal stressed that the language as broadcast in
the afternoon was indecent and was subject to regulation under Miller."9
In a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and affirmed the FCC."I The Court held that the FCC does have the

101. See id at 99. The sanctions the FCC has the authority to impose include: (1)
revocation of a station's license; (2) issuance of a cease and desist order; (3) imposition of a
monetary forfeiture; (4) denial of license renewal; and (5) granting of a short term renewal.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 n.l (1978).
102. See In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975), rey'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
103. See id at 98. Offensive programming should be regulated by principles analogous
to those found in the law of nuisance where the law generally speaks to channeling behavior
more than actually prohibiting it. See id at 98.
104. See id at 98.
105. See id at 98.
106. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
107. See id at 15-16; see also 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). "Nothing in this chapter shall be
understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication." Id
108. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 21-30 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, J., concurring), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
109. See id at 31-32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
110. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978).
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authority, pursuant to the Communications Act, to sanction licensees who
engage inobscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting.'I' Supporting the
position taken by Judge Leventhal, the Court reviewed only the FCC's
determination that the monologue was indecent "as broadcast."' " 2 The
plurality noted that the FCC had limited its order to the specific factual
context; therefore, the Court similarly held in this narrow context and expressly refrained from issuing an advisory opinion for future cases." 3
The Pacifica Foundation had argued that, in order for the Carlin monologue to be indecent within the meaning of the applicable federal criminal
statute," 14 it would have to appeal to the prurient interest, which it clearly
did not." 5 The Court disagreed and expressly stated that the three types
of proscribed language, obscene, indecent, and profane, each have a separate and distinct meaning." 6 To be indecent, material merely must fail to
conform with accepted standards of morality and need not have prurient
appeal."' The Carlin monologue, being patently offensive, was therefore
indecent under the terms of the statute."i8
The Court then turned to the constitutional implications of the FCC's

11i.
See id.at 738.
112. See id.at 735. Judge Leventhal stressed that the timing of the broadcast was vital
to the FCC order. The words were broadcast in the early afternoon when children were
undoubtedly in the audience. The FCC order was not read to prohibit absolutely from any
television or radio broadcast any one of the seven words. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 556
F.2d 9, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., dissenting), rev'd 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
113. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
115. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1978).
116. See id at 739-40.
117. See id.at 740. In a footnote, the Court cited Webster's definition of indecent: "a:
Altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or what circumstances would
dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable: UNSEEMLY. . .b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality: ...." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L
DICTIONARY (1966), cited in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978).
118. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 741 (1978). The FCC's definition of
indecency, within the meaning of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)), at least at times of
the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience, obviated all of
the Supreme Court's requirements for obscenity except one, which was altered. Unlike obscenity, indecency need not appeal to the prurient interest, need not be taken as a whole, and
may have, in context, serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. See id at 741.
Indecency is judged applying contemporary community standards "for the broadcast medium" rather than just applying the standards unqualified as for obscenity. Compare Memorandum Opinion & Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975) (modifies Miller three-pronged test
for obscenity with regard to application of contemporary community standards), rev'd, 556
F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (three-pronged test for obscenity). See generally M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE
§ 6.05[2] (rev. ed. 1982) ("The Seven Dirty Words" case discussed in chapter entitled "Significant Problems").
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action."1 9 The Court recognized that, while all forms of communication
receive consideration for first amendment protection, the protection provided broadcasting is the most limited. 2 ' Broadcasting is singled out for
two reasons: first, because it is uniquely pervasive in its extension into the
privacy of the home; and second, because it is uniquely accessible to chil" ' The plurality asserted that
dren, a group which needs to be protected. 12
in this context the individual's privacy interests outweigh the first amendment rights of the intruder.12 2 The Court stated that many variables are
important in determining whether publicly disseminated material is indecent, including the time of day, composition of the audience, content of the
program, and the medium of expression.' 2 3 Thus, the Pacfca Court, in
stressing that their opinion only applied to the specific factual context at
issue,'" 4 left many questions unanswered regarding content control on
other media of communication, particularly cable television.
VI.

INDECENT CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING

With the recent boom in the cable television industry much attention
has focused on the content of cable programming. 25 As the FCC regulates interstate and foreign communication, it does not preempt regulation
by local government; therefore, municipalities and states are free to be12 6
come involved in regulation of the subject matter on cable television.
Any action taken by a state or local government attempting to regulate
cable content, however, must not abridge fundamental first amendment
rights. 127 There are two general schools of thought: the moral activists use
119. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
120. See id at 748.
121. See id at 748-50.
122. See id at 748.
123. See id at 750.
124. See id at 750.
125. See Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32
CATH. U.L. REV. 604, 605-06 (1983) (discussion of how growth of cable makes resolving first
amendment issues very important).
126. See Kroeger v. Stahl, 148 F. Supp. 403, 408 (D. N.J. 1957) (FCC does not preclude
states from exercise of police power in applicable situtations), ad 248 F.2d 121 (3d Cir.
1957); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) ("Iflor the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio"); see also M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE
§ 3.01 at 3-2 (rev. ed. 1982) (discussion of increased state involvement in regulation of cable
television as federal involvement decreases).
127. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ("No person shall by
means of cable television . . . distribute . . . obscene or indecent material.") (quoting
Miami, Fla. Ordinance 9583 (Jan. 13, 1983)); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy
City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1173-74 (N.D. Utah 1982) (person who knowingly distributes pornographic or indecent material may have franchise agreement revoked or other sanctions
imposed) (citing Roy CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES 17-3-2 (1982)); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
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the Pac4'ca opinion as support for the proposition that indecent material
may be banned from cable television,' 2 8 while the first amendment advocates cite the holding in Miller to support their contention that only material rising to the level of obscenity may be proscribed by local, state, or
federal law.' 2 9 Lobbying groups on both sides of the issue have formed all
over the country, and a group called Morality in Media has drafted a
model cable indecency statute.' 30 Two cities and the state of Utah have,
thus far, litigated the issue, and in all three instances, the challenged laws
proscribing indecency
were declared to be unconstitutional by federal dis3
trict court judges.' '
A. Legislative Attempts at Regulation
In 1981, the legislature of the state of Utah enacted a statute which
would punish any person "knowingly distribut[ing] by wire or cable any

Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 989-90 n.l (N.D. Utah 1982) ("No person ... shall knowingly
distribute by wire or cable any pornographic or indecent material .. ")(quoting UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981). The Policy Review and Development Division of
the FCC's Cable Television Bureau periodically prepares a comprehensive review of state
activities with regard to cable regulation. See Briley, Cable Television State Regulation - A
Survey of Franchising and other State Law and Regulations (FCC 1977, 1980), cited in M.
HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 3.01 at 3-2 n.8 (rev. ed. 1982).
128. See Tell, Cable TV's Sex Problem, 4 NAT'L L.J. 1, 28-29 (Feb. 15, 1982).
129. See id at 28-29.
130. See Krattenmaker & Esterow, CensoringIndecent CablePrograms.- The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 606, 610-11 n.19 (1983). The model
indecency statute authored by Morality in Media provides in part:
Section 1
(a) No person (including franchisee) shall by means of a cable television system,
knowingly distribute by wire or cable to its subscribers any indecent material or knowingly provide such material for distribution.
(e) "Indecent material" shall mean material which is a representation or verbal
description of:
(1)a human sexual or excretory organ or function; or
(2) nudity; or
(3) ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or
(4) masturbation;
which under contemporary community standards for cable television is patently
offensive.
Section 2
Violation of this statute shall constitute a misdemeanor and any person convicted of
such violation shall be confined in jail for not more than - months or fined not more
Dollars, either or both.
than Id at 610-11 n.19.
131. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 126 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television
of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1172-73 (N.D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 999 (N. D. Utah 1982).
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pornographic or indecent material to its subscribers. '' I32 In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 133 Judge Jenkins permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute, finding it violated the rights of the cable system
34
operators and programmers under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The court held that, since Miller describes the permissible scope of state
regulation of content, any statute seeking to proscribe material must include Miller's three-part test, which the statute at issue failed to do. 135
While the Miller test requires the work be taken as a whole in determining
whether it constitutes obscenity, the Utah statute proscribed "descriptions
or depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality" and "nude or partially
denuded figures" without any reference to context; thus, the statute was
outside the established boundaries set by Miller. 136 Although the court did
not reach the specific issue of the first amendment right of cable operators
to show indecent material, it did indicate that any attempt to proscribe
137
indecent material on cable television would be unconstitutional.
Shortly after rendering his decision in the Wilkinson case, Judge Jenkins
was called upon to determine the constitutionality of a city ordinance
132. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229 (Supp. 1981). In part, the statute reads as
follows:
(1) No person, including a franchisee, shall knowingly distribute by wire or cable
any pornographic or indecent material to its subscribers.
(4) For purposes of this section "indecent material" means any material descirbed in
section 76-10-1227.
Id "Indecent material" is defined by statute as follows:
(1) "Description or depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality" means:
(a) Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(b) Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or sodomy;' or
(c) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock, or
female breast.
(2) "Nude or partially denuded figures" means:
(a) Less than completely and opaquely covered:
(i) Human genitals;
(ii) Pubic regions;
(iii) Buttock; and
(iv) Female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola;
and
(b) Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and
opaquely covered.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1227 (Supp. 1981).
133. 531 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Utah 1982).
134. See id at 999.
135. See id at 998.
136. See id at 996.
137. See id at 1002. The challengers' only concern was the indecency portion of the
statute, not the section dealing with pornography. See id at 1002.
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which, like the Utah statute, prohibited indecency on cable television. 38
As commentators had predicted, the ordinance was declared unconstitutional in Community Cablevision of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City. 139 Roy City
cited several statutory provisions as providing its authority to impose restrictions on cable content, including the city's power to improve
morals, 14 to control streets,14 1 and to franchise and license.' 42 Additionally, the city cited a need to protect children. 43 The city relied on Pacifca
for support of its position and analogized its regulatory power to that of
the FCC in that case.144
The plaintiffs, a cable television distributor and distributees, asserted
that, while the city may have stipulated powers, those powers are all subject to first amendment limitations. 45 Additionally, they argued that the
permissible limits of first amendment regulations, as set forth in Miller and
applied in46 Wilkinson, prohibit such an attempt to control wire-transmitted
content.
The court expressed its understanding of the city's concern over "trash"
on television but held that the sections of the ordinance prohibiting indecency were proscribing protected communication and, in so doing, were
unconstitutional. 4 Pacifica dealt with broadcasting, and Judge Jenkins
asserted that the essential differences between cable and broadcast television made Roy City's reliance on Pacfica misplaced. 4 8 According to the
court, the crucial factor distinguishing transmission by cable from broadcasting was choice, and the elements of choice encompassed various levels:
(1) one may choose whether or not to subscribe to cable; (2) one may
choose to cancel the subscription at any time; and (3) one may choose from

138. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66
(N.D. Utah 1982).
139. See id at 1172-73.
140. See id. at 1166 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-8-4,-8,-41,-80 (1973); UTAH CONST.
art. XI, § 5).
141. See id. at 1166 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-8-8, 10-8-11 (1973)).
142. See id. at 1166 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-4 (1973)).
143. See id. at 1166.
144. See id at 1166. The defendants drew several other analogies between their case
and the Pacifica holding, including: (1) the broadcasting of signals through the air to the
sending of electronic signals through wires as is done with cable; (2) pervasiveness of the
widespread use of cable service within its community; and (3) the protection of the public
interest to the charge of Roy City to improve the morals of its residents. See id at 1166-67.
145. See id. at 1166.
146. See id. at 1166.
147. See id. at 1167, 1173.
148. See id. at 1167. The opinion listed the following differences:
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a variety of services offered. 149 The court rejected as unconstitutional the
proposed Roy City ordinance for its prohibition of material not rising to
the level of obscenity and reiterated that the three-pronged Miller test must
be applied to justify a ban on any potentially offensive transmission.' 50
Following the lead of the federal district court in Utah, a federal district
judge in Florida drew a clear distinction between broadcast and cable television in Cruz v. Ferre.'I' The issue addressed was whether the city of
Miami could define certain material as indecent and then regulate its dissemination through cable television.' 5 2 Judge Hoeveler, while sympathetic
with the city's attempt to improve the moral climate, nonetheless found the
effort to regulate in this manner violative of the first amendment guarantee
of free speech.' 53 Like the Roy City ordinance, this one was held to be
overly broad and facially defective.' 54

Broadcast
1. User need not subscribe.
2. User holds no power to cancel. May
complain to F.C.C., station,
network, or sponsor.
3. Extensive advertising.
3. Limited advertising.
4. Transmittal through public airwaves.
4. Transmittal through wires.
5. User receives signal on private cable. 5. User appropriates signal from the
public airwaves.
6. User does not pay a fee.
6. User pays a fees.
7. User receives daily and weekly
7. User receives preview of coming
listing in public press or
attractions.
commercial guides.
8. Neither distributor nor distributee
8. Distributor or distributee may add
may add services or signals or
services and expanded spectrum of
choices.
signals or channels and choices.
9. Airwaves are not privately owned
9. Wires are privately owned.
but are publicly controlled.
Id at 1167. The FCC, acting in response to an opinion by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, ceased including transmission by cable in its definition of broadcasting.
See Order of December 7, 1977, 67 F.C.C.2d 252, 252-53 (1977) (construing Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 829 (1977)). A dictionary definition of broadcasting contains no reference to cable: "broadcast ... 3. Radio
& Television. To send out from a transmitting station (information, lectures, music,
messages or pictures) by radio telegraph, radio telephone, or other radio transmission, for an
unlimited number of receiving stations." WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 339 (2d ed.
1955).
149. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Sup. 1164, 1168
(N.D. Utah 1982).
150. See id at 1169.
151. 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
152. See id at 126.
153. See id at 126.
154. See id at 130-31.
Cable
1. User needs to subscribe.
2. User holds power to cancel
subscriptions.
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The Inapplicability of Paciflca in the Cable Context

The first amendment does not protect obscenity in any form on any medium of expression, including cable television.' 55 Obscenity is unprotected
because it provides minimal contribution to the social dialogue and is offensive by contemporary moral standards.'5 6 But, because of recognized
dangers inherent in regulating any form of expression, legislation aimed at
obscenity must be carefully and precisely drawn, utilizing the accepted
Miller standards.' 5 7 Indecent speech, despite its offensiveness to some, is
provided with some first amendment protection because it does not rise to
the level of obscenity. 5 The three cable cases discussed previously involved legislation which swept too broadly by proscribing speech with first
amendment protection. 5 9
Pacjica has very limited application, in the cable television context, in
that it only states that, through applying a nuisance rationale, broadcasted
indecency may be channeled with reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.' 6 ° Pacfica does not stand for the proposition that indecency has
no first amendment protection.' 6 1 Broadcasted indecency is not a fixed
concept as the cable legislation considered seems to imply.' 62 Instead, it is
a variable factor depending, among other things, on the composition of the
audience and the time of broadcast.' 6 3 Absolute proscriptions based on an
absolute definition of indecency ignore the narrow fact-specific holding of
the Pac#7ca Court." 6 The Utah, Roy City, and Miami legislation all prohibit indecency on a wholesale basis without reference to any of the variables crucial to the decision in Pac~ica.165
155. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
156. See id at 484-85, 489.
157. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
158. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
159. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ("No person shall by
means of cable television . . . distribute . . . obscene or indecent material.") (quoting
Miami, Fla., Ordinance 9583 (Jan. 13, 1983)); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy
City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1173-74 (N.D. Utah 1982) ("franchise agreements ... may be
revoked or other sanctions imposed for ... knowingly distribut[ing] any pornographic or
") (quoting Roy CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES 17-3-2 (1982); Home
indecent material ..
Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 989-90 n.I (N.D. Utah 1982) ("No person
... shall knowingly distribute by wire or cable any pornographic or indecent material ....
) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981).
160. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978); see also Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (state or municipality may pass reasonable time,
place, manner regulations to protect individual privacy).
161. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
162. See id at 750.
163. See id. at 750.
164. See id at 750.
165. See Miami, Fla., Ordinance 9583 (Jan. 13, 1983), cited in Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F.
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The Pac#ica Court also noted that different first amendment questions
presented by the different media forms merit inconsistent methods of regulation. 66 Broadcasting has historically been afforded more limited first
amendment protection than any other medium of expression.' 67 This is so
because of its pervasiveness,' 68 its ability to invade the privacy of the
home, 169 its unique accessibility to children, 7 ° and the limited broadcast
space available on the electromagnetic spectrum.17 1 Therefore, another
medium would not, by implication, be subject to the same restricted first
amendment protection.172 A comparison of broadcast and cable television
illustrates the inapplicability of PacqFca in the cable context.
Broadcast communication is pervasive in that it is transmitted through
the publicly controlled airways from which the user acquires the signal
without charge and without a subscription. 173 Cable, on the other hand, is
transmitted via privately owned cable wires only to those who pay a fee for
subscription to the service.' 74 Unlike traditional broadcast television,
cable provides greater control to the viewer who may decide whether to
subscribe. 17' Therefore, invasion of privacy of the home which is a justification for greater control over the broadcast media is not a factor for cable
subscribers who bring cable into the home only by choice.' 76 Furthermore, programming which may be unsuitable for children or other immature viewers may be controlled by supervising adults with the use of a
"lock-box" operable only with a "parental key."' 7 7 In the Cruz opinion,
the federal district court in Miami suggested that this ability to avoid harm
to children and immature viewers "sounds the death knell of Pacica's

Supp. 125, 127 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Roy CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES 17-3-2 (1982), citedin Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1173-74 (N.D. Utah 1982);
UTAH CODE ANNt. § 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981), cited in Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 989-90 n.l (N.D. Utah 1982).
166. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (mentioning radio, television, and closed-circuit transmissions).
167. See id at 748; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969) (stating difference in characteristics justify application of different first amendment
standards).
168. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
169. See id at 748.
170. See id at 749.
171. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977).
172. See id at 44.
173. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167
(N.D. Utah 1982).
174. Seeid at 1167.
175. See id at 1167.
176. See id at 1168.
177. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 132 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
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applicability in the cable television context."' 7 8
The further justification for FCC regulation of broadcast content is the
scarcity of channels available.' 79 Only a certain number of stations can
operate simultaneously without interfering with one another.18 0 The
Supreme Court determined that this scarcity allows the FCC to consider
the type and content of program services to be offered in licensing broadcast channels.' 8' This allocation problem does not apply to cable television, however, which has no physical scarcity of channels or problem of
interference. 82
C. Implicationsfor Texas
If a person is to be convicted of an obscenity offense in Texas, as in any
other state, the material or performance involved must meet the three-pronged Miller test, which was incorporated into the statutory definition of
obscenity.' 83 To be obscene, under the Miller test, the work must not only
178. Id at 132.
179. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977).
180. See id at 44.
181. See id at 44.
182. See id at 44-45. "The first amendment theory espoused in National Broadcasting
Co. and reaffirmed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. cannot be directly applied to cable television since an essential precondition of that theory-physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is absent." Id at 44-45; see also Note, Cable
Television and Content Regulation.- The FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 133, 135 (1976) (cable channel capacity may become unlimited in
future).
183. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
(1) "Obscene" means material or a performance that:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
that taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
(B) depicts or describes:
(i) patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including sexual intercourse, sodomy, and
sexual bestiality; or
(ii) patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, exretory
functions, sadism, masochism, lewd exhibition of the genitals, the male or female
genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state or a device designed and marketed as useful primarily for stimulation of the human genital organs; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value.
Id.
The basic guidelines [for determining if material is obscene] for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether the 'average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
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appeal to the prurient interest when taken as a whole and lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, but also must depict or describe "in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law."' 84 Under Texas law, the "sexual conduct" incorporated into the Miller test includes:
(i) . . .ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,
including sexual intercourse, sodomy, and sexual bestiality; or
(ii) . . .masturbation, excretory functions, sadism, masochism, lewd
exhibition of the genitals, the male or female genitals in a state of
sexual stimulation or arousal, covered male genitals in a discernibly
turgid state or a device designed and marketed as useful primarily for
stimulation of the human genital organs; 8 5
Texas has no statute attempting to define or proscribe indecent material or
performances and has no statute specifically addressing cable content.
Thus far, no cable cases have been prosecuted under the obsenity portion
of the code.
Any city ordinance attempting to impose criminal sanctions on a cable
system for showing obscene material would probably be preempted under
section 1.08 of the Texas Penal Code which states: "No governmental subdivision or agency may enact or enforce a law that makes any conduct
covered by the code an offense subject to a criminal penalty. This section
shall apply only as long as the law governing the conduct proscribed by
this code is legally enforceable."' 8 6 As the Texas Penal Code does contain
provisions making obscenity a crime and this provision has not been declared unconstitutional, prosecution remains the province of the state, and
cities seemingly are not free to enforce criminal sanctions for obscene material on cable television.' 87 This is not to say that the Penal Code does
not allow for prosecution of obscenity on cable television, only that the city
may not preempt the state's authority to do so.' 88
Cities with cable systems in Texas have, for the most part, not attempted
to regulate the content of cable programming.' 89 Those cities are appar(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also McMahon v. State, 630 S.W.2d 730, 732
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (Texas obscenity statute meets Miller standards); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (Miller test met by Texas
statutory standards for obscenity).
184. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
185. TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
186. Id § 1.08.
187. See id § 1.08.
188. See id § 1.08.
189. See, e.g., Letter from Lloyd Garza, City Attorney, Killeen, Tex., to author (Sept.
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ently mindful of the Texas statutory preemption problems with reference
to obscenity, as well as constitutional problems involved in attempting to
proscribe indecent material not rising to the level of obscenity. 190 From a
monetary point of view, cities may not be prepared to mount a challenge
against indecent material which would likely involve lengthy, costly
litigation. '9'
VII. CONCLUSION
Indecent programming on cable television, while undoubtedly offensive
to many viewers, is nonetheless protected by the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. Cable television is distinguishable from broadcast television so that the factors which justify limited first amendment
protection for broadcasting, as outlined in Pacfica, have no application in
a cable television context. Miller provides the standard for judging
whether material is obscene and thereby unconstitutional, and until the
Supreme Court decides otherwise, statutes and ordinances drafted without
Miller in mind will undoubtedly suffer the fate of the Miami, Roy City,
and Utah legislation considered herein. Regardless of individual sentiment or governmental concerns, our judicial system has, thus far, determined that the first amendment is alive and well on cable television.
15, 1983) (stating City of Killeen does not have an ordinance regulating cable programming
content); Letter from Merril E. Nunn, City Attorney, Amarillo, Tex., to author (Sept. 9,
1983) (stating City of Amarillo does not proscribe any kind of program for local cable television company); Letter from Mindy Ward, City Attorney, San Angelo, Tex., to author (Sept.
9, 1983) (stating City of San Angelo has never attempted to regulate the content of programs
shown on cable television).
190. See, e.g., Letter from Randall B. Strong, City Attorney, Baytown, Tex., to author
(Sept. 13, 1983) (expressing City's reluctance to enter business of determining what is "indecent" or "obscene"); Letter from R. Clayton Hutchins, City Attorney, Grand Prairie, Tex.,
to author (Sept. 9, 1983) (expressing belief that "it would be extremely difficult to draft an
ordinance . . . which would meet constitutional muster"); Memo from Robert S. Briggs,
Asst. City Attorney, to Russell Lancaster, City Councilman, Fort Worth, Tex. (April 29,
1983) (stating any ordinance regulating indecency or obscenity on cable television would
probably be preempted by section 1.08 of the Texas Penal Code).
191. Letter from Richard E. Henderson, Asst. City Attorney, to Wade Adkins, City
Attorney, Fort Worth, Tex. (April 29, 1983) ("As cities are becoming increasingly aware, the
civil rights attorneys' fees that the city could lose in a legal contest if it were to embark on a
course of illegal censorship would be staggering.").
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